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In 1950 people aged 65+ represented about 1 in 12 of the US population. Today their share is around 1 in 
7. While declining fertility formed the basis for this growth from the end of the 19
th
 century until WWII, 
since the 1960s falling old-age mortality has been an additional driving force. This ‘population aging’ has 
worried policy makers because for every worker paying tax and social security there are more older 
‘dependent’ citizens, with greater demands on social insurance, health and welfare systems and increasing 
prevalence of morbidity and disability [1-3].  
The standard indicator of population aging is the old-age dependency ratio (OADR). It takes the number 
of those who have reached the state pension age and divides it by the number of ‘working age’ (16-64 
years) adults to measure the dependent elderly population relative to those who pay for them. In the US 
the OADR went from 12.7 elderly per 100 of working age in 1950 to about 20 today, and may reach 35% 
by 2050. This has increased policy makers’ concern despite lower levels than in other high-income 
countries [4]. However, the OADR is not ‘fit for purpose’, as it counts neither the dependent elderly nor 
those who sustain them. It merely takes a cut-off point (the state pension age) and assigns adults to the 
two sides of the ratio accordingly. We propose several alternative measures that give a more accurate but 
different account. 
 
Counting the dependent elderly 
Paradoxically, the main process that causes population aging – declining old-age mortality – makes age a 
poor measure of its progress. When lifespans lengthen, any given age becomes a marker reached earlier 
along the life course. In 1950 mean period life expectancy for women in the US aged 65 was 15 years. 
Today this has risen to 21 years (resp. 13 and 18 years for men) (www.mortality.org). We can best 
capture this changing significance of age by realizing that the age of a population comprises two 
components: the years lived of its members (their ages) and their years left (their remaining life 
expectancies or RLE). In a period of lengthening lifespans, not only does the average age of the 
population increase, so too does the RLE associated with each age [5]. Its effects are substantial. At the 
end of the baby boom in the late 1960s the median age of the population was just under 28, but now it is 
37. Yet over the course of the 20
th
 century, life expectancy across all ages also increased. We thus have 
the situation that for instance in 1950 the median age of 30 carried a RLE of an additional 42 years but 37 
year olds in 2011 could expect to live another 43 years. In aggregate terms, the population of 2011, 
despite being 7 years ‘older’ as measured by years lived, was nevertheless one year ‘younger’ than that of 
1950 in terms of years left for its members to enjoy. This is crucial, because many behaviors and attitudes 
(including those related to health) are more strongly linked to RLE than age [6-9]. Using both years lived 
and years left also helps remind us that populations and individuals are rather different things.  
The OADR defines all people above the statutory pension age as ‘dependent’, regardless of their 
economic, social or medical circumstances. This overlooks the fact that rising RLEs render these elderly 
‘younger’, healthier and fitter than their peers in earlier cohorts. Many have accumulated substantial 
assets, may still be working and many have valuable experience or specialist knowledge. Many do 
volunteer work vital to the ‘third sector’ or look after grandchildren. We know that most acute medical 
care costs occur in the final months of life, with little impact from the age at which these months occur [4 
10]. At least some forms of disability are being postponed to later ages. Good data on population health 
by age is only available for the last decade, but RLE data is a robust substitute as it provides a more 
accurate picture of the extent of aging by taking account of falling old-age mortality. Therefore, following 
Sanderson and Scherbov and others [4 11-13] we use RLE of 15 years or less as the threshold of 
dependency, but do so for each sex separately [14]. 
 
Counting the ‘working’ population 
The OADR assumes that everyone of ‘working age’ actually works. However the knowledge economy 
keeps youngsters in education for longer while many older workers choose or are obliged to retire early. 
Meanwhile, greater gender equality, dual career families and migration have added 44 million women 
workers over the last 50 years (vs. +31 million male workers). Using age to define the working population 
thus makes little sense. Indeed, if we count those not employed, for whatever reason, as ‘dependent’ we 
find that there are more ‘dependents’ of ‘working’ age (70 million) than non-working elderly (36 million). 
We thus use the number employed over all ages for the denominator of what we call the Real Elderly 
Dependency Ratio (REDR) [14], i.e.: 
 
     
                                            
                      
 
 
Results 
If we define the dependent elderly population as those with ages at which RLE is 15 years or less, we find 
a very different trend than observed for standard measures of aging. For instance, in the 1950s the 
proportion of those with life expectancies of 15 years or less to live (Prop. RLE15–) was still higher than 
those aged 65+ (Prop 65+). Early mortality improvements were concentrated on younger ages, for 
example through the defeat of child killing infectious diseases, but from the late 1970s improvements to 
old-age mortality kicked in. These reversed the rise in the proportion of the population with low life 
expectancies, as Figure 1 shows. 
We can now add in the trend in employment, where later entry to employment, and earlier exit from it, 
has been more than offset by the dramatic rise in mothers employment, so that the proportion of the 
working-age population who are at work is higher now (66%) to what it was in 1960 (60%), although it is 
down from before the economic crisis (73% in 2000). Putting these two series together we have the Real 
Elderly Dependency Ratio (REDR). As Figure 2 shows, this has actually fallen by almost one third since 
1960, while, the conventional OADR increased. Looking into the future, the OADR will rise while the 
REDR, much more dependent on the employed population, is set to remain stable until about 2020. 
Moreover, our projection is a conservative one: we assumed that age-specific labor force participation 
rates will slowly increase to levels observed before the economic crisis, but did not adjust for the gradual 
raising of the State Pension Age to 67 by 2027, disincentives to early retirement and further progress on 
gender equality. 
 
International comparison 
The increase in the OADR in recent decades is not unique to the US. On the contrary, due to the younger 
population and relatively high rates of immigration the OADR is lower than most other western countries 
(Figure 3). Similarly, the REDR has also declined in other industrialized countries, but whereby the US is 
in a more favorable position despite the fact that it has stabilized and is likely to increase gradually over 
the next couple of decades. For instance, in Germany and Italy, the REDR has been almost flat for two 
decades, owing to slower employment growth and lower birth rates than elsewhere in the developed 
world. One reason why immigration has played an important role in depressing many countries’ REDR is 
by raising employment rates. Increased labor-force participation among women –who spend a 
significantly higher share of their lives in employment than they did 50 years ago, when most women 
withdrew from employment after marriage or childbirth –has also helped to lower REDRs. Of course, 
failure to support these trends has the opposite effect. Japan – where opposition to immigration and 
failure to embrace gender equality lead to a rapidly rising REDR –is a case in point. A low female-
employment rate also raised India’s REDR, albeit less drastically. Russia, too, has seen its REDR increase 
substantially, owing to post-communist economic dislocation. But the rest of the major emerging 
economies still enjoy relatively low REDRs. 
 
  
Time to death 
There is still room for improvement in the way population ageing is measured, including with regard to 
some of the recent alternatives that have been proposed [4 11 13 14], as RLE15- is a population average 
measurement and many persons in the corresponding age group may still live another 20 years while 
others die within two. Moreover, as the literature also shows, time to death (TTD) is a better indicator for 
health care expenditure [15]. We therefore propose to use the age obtained by RLE15- (as we are here 
interested in elderly but without a fixed age), but the population split into TTD. Figures 1 shows that in 
terms of elderly with acute health needs, measured by a TTD of <5 years, the burden has been stable since 
1980 (4 per population of 100), also when dividing by the population who are actually in employment 
(REDR2 in Figure 2) rather than the total population (Prop RLE15-&TTD<5 in Figure 1). Only after 
2020 will the REDR1 and REDR2 start to rise (and the latter indicator still very slowly), while the 
commonly used OADR has already been rising for close to a decade and especially since 2010.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The very different story of population aging told by our measure has several important implications for 
policy:  
1. The OADR is a poor indicator. It gives a false picture of the both the level and trend in population 
aging because it takes no account of rising life expectancies. We have suggested several alternatives here.  
2. It is wrong to assume that population aging itself will strain health and social care systems. Demand for 
services will rise, but will continue to be driven by other factors, chiefly progress in medical knowledge 
and technology. Moreover as others have suggested, the economic costs of old age dependency have 
typically been exaggerated and especially so in the US [16 17]. However this needs to be set against the 
insight that the last decades have been ones in which the population, far from ‘aging’ has in fact been 
getting younger, producing something of a ‘demographic dividend’.  
3. The relationship between ‘old’ and ‘age’ is changing as continued falls in mortality delay the typical 
onset of senescence and its associated morbidities [10 18 19] Indeed, TTD is a more important marker 
than age. 4. Urgent attention ought to be paid to the relationship between morbidity and RLE. Age 
specific disability rates appear to be falling [10 20-22], yet recently born generations have a worse risk 
factor profile than older generations. For instance, current obesity trends may have a major impact on 
public health as ‘metabolic risk factor’-related diseases such as diabetes. Aging-related diseases like 
osteoarthritis are predicted to significantly increase and start at a younger age, increasing the risk of 
cardiovascular and other chronic diseases. It also suggests that the aging process can speed up as well as 
slow down, with obvious implications for public health policy. 
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Fig 1.Proportion aged 65+ (Prop65+), in age groups with Remaining Fig 2. OADR and the Real Elderly Dependency Ratio with elderly in ages with RLE15- 
Life Expectancy≤ 15 years(Prop.RLE15–) and where TTD<5 years  (REDR1) and with RLE15- andTTD<5 years (REDR2). 
 
 
Fig. 3. Real Elderly Dependency Ration and Old Age Dependency Ratio in select high-income countries and BRIC countries, 1950-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Human Mortality Database (www.mortality.org); 
www.oecd.org; US Census Bureau (www.census.org); 
International Labour Organization (www.ilo.org/) and 
National statistics offices. Authors’ calculations. 
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